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Abstract
How do shared conventions emerge in complex decentralized social systems? This question engages fields as
diverse as linguistics, sociology, and cognitive science. Previous empirical attempts to solve this puzzle all
presuppose that formal or informal institutions, such as incentives for global agreement, coordinated
leadership, or aggregated information about the population, are needed to facilitate a solution. Evolutionary
theories of social conventions, by contrast, hypothesize that such institutions are not necessary in order for
social conventions to form. However, empirical tests of this hypothesis have been hindered by the difficulties
of evaluating the real-time creation of new collective behaviors in large decentralized populations. Here, we
present experimental results—replicated at several scales—that demonstrate the spontaneous creation of
universally adopted social conventions and show how simple changes in a population’s network structure can
direct the dynamics of norm formation, driving human populations with no ambition for large scale
coordination to rapidly evolve shared social conventions.
Disciplines
Communication | Social and Behavioral Sciences
Comments
This is a manuscript version of the article.
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/584
 1 
 
The	  Spontaneous	  Emergence	  of	  Conventions:	  	  An	  Experimental	  
Study	  of	  Cultural	  Evolution	  Damon	  Centolaa,b	  	  and	  	  Andrea	  Baronchellic,*	  a.	  Annenberg	  School	  of	  Communication,	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  Philadelphia,	  PA	  19106	  	  b.	  Center	  for	  Advanced	  Study	  in	  the	  Behavioral	  Sciences,	  Stanford	  University,	  Palo	  Alto,	  CA	  94305	  	  c.	  Department	  of	  Mathematics,	  City	  University	  London,	  Northampton	  Square,	  London	  EC1V	  0HB,	  UK 	 	  
	  
Abstract:	  How	  do	  shared	  conventions	  emerge	  in	  complex	  decentralized	  social	  systems?	  	  This	  question	  engages	  fields	  as	  diverse	  as	  linguistics,	  sociology	  and	  cognitive	  science.	  	  Previous	  empirical	  attempts	  to	  solve	  this	  puzzle	  all	  presuppose	  that	  formal	  or	  informal	  institutions,	  such	  as	  incentives	  for	  global	  agreement,	  coordinated	  leadership,	  or	  aggregated	  information	  about	  the	  population,	  are	  needed	  to	  facilitate	  a	  solution.	  	  Evolutionary	  theories	  of	  social	  conventions,	  by	  contrast,	  hypothesize	  that	  such	  institutions	  are	  not	  necessary	  in	  order	  for	  social	  conventions	  to	  form.	  	  However,	  empirical	  tests	  of	  this	  hypothesis	  have	  been	  hindered	  by	  the	  difficulties	  of	  evaluating	  the	  real-­‐time	  creation	  of	  new	  collective	  behaviors	  in	  large	  decentralized	  populations.	  	  Here,	  we	  present	  experimental	  results	  –	  replicated	  at	  several	  scales	  –	  that	  demonstrate	  the	  spontaneous	  creation	  of	  universally	  adopted	  social	  conventions,	  and	  show	  how	  simple	  changes	  in	  a	  population’s	  network	  structure	  can	  direct	  the	  dynamics	  of	  norm	  formation,	  driving	  human	  populations	  with	  no	  ambition	  for	  large	  scale	  coordination	  to	  rapidly	  evolve	  shared	  social	  conventions.	  	  	  	  *	  To	  whom	  correspondence	  should	  be	  addressed.	  Email:	  a.baronchelli.work@gmail.com.	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Significance	  Statement:	  	  Social	  conventions	  shape	  every	  aspect	  of	  our	  lives,	  from	  how	  we	  greet	  each	  other	  to	  the	  languages	  we	  speak.	  	  Yet,	  their	  origins	  have	  been	  a	  topic	  of	  theoretical	  speculation	  since	  the	  time	  of	  Aristotle.	  	  Most	  approaches	  assume	  that	  institutions	  are	  necessary	  to	  organize	  large	  populations,	  but	  the	  simplest	  explanation	  is	  that	  universally	  accepted	  conventions	  are	  the	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  individuals’	  efforts	  to	  coordinate	  locally	  with	  one	  another.	  	  While	  this	  hypothesis	  is	  compelling,	  it	  lacks	  conclusive	  empirical	  support.	  	  Here,	  we	  present	  results	  from	  controlled	  experiments	  demonstrating	  that	  changes	  in	  network	  connectivity	  can	  cause	  global	  social	  conventions	  to	  spontaneously	  emerge	  from	  local	  interactions,	  even	  though	  people	  have	  no	  knowledge	  about	  the	  population,	  or	  that	  they	  are	  coordinating	  at	  a	  global	  scale.	  	  
	  
Introduction	  Social	  conventions	  are	  the	  foundation	  for	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  (1-­‐7),	  Yet,	  it	  remains	  a	  central	  question	  in	  the	  social,	  behavioral,	  and	  cognitive	  sciences	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  patterns	  of	  collective	  behavior	  can	  emerge	  from	  seemingly	  arbitrary	  initial	  conditions	  (2-­‐4,	  8,	  9).	  	  Large	  populations	  frequently	  manage	  to	  coordinate	  on	  shared	  conventions	  despite	  a	  continuously	  evolving	  stream	  of	  alternatives	  to	  choose	  from,	  and	  no	  a	  priori	  differences	  in	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  the	  options	  (1,	  3,	  4,	  10).	  	  For	  instance,	  populations	  are	  able	  to	  produce	  linguistic	  conventions	  on	  accepted	  names	  for	  children	  and	  pets	  (11),	  on	  common	  names	  for	  colors	  (12),	  and	  on	  popular	  terms	  for	  novel	  cultural	  artifacts,	  such	  as	  referring	  to	  junk	  email	  as	  “SPAM”	  (13,	  14).	  	  Similarly,	  economic	  conventions,	  such	  as	  bartering	  systems	  (2),	  beliefs	  about	  fairness	  (3),	  and	  consensus	  regarding	  the	  exchangeability	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  (15),	  emerge	  with	  clear	  and	  widespread	  agreement	  within	  economic	  communities,	  yet	  vary	  broadly	  across	  them	  (3,	  16).	  	  Prominent	  theories	  of	  social	  conventions	  suggest	  that	  institutional	  mechanisms	  –	  such	  as	  centralized	  authority	  (14),	  incentives	  for	  collective	  agreement	  (15),	  social	  leadership	  (16),	  or	  aggregated	  information	  (17)	  –	  can	  explain	  global	  coordination.	  	  However,	  these	  theories	  do	  not	  explain	  whether,	  or	  how,	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  conventions	  to	  emerge	  when	  social	  institutions	  are	  not	  already	  in	  place	  to	  guide	  the	  process.	  	  A	  compelling	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alternative	  approach	  comes	  from	  theories	  of	  social	  evolution	  (2,	  18-­‐20).	  	  Social	  evolutionary	  theories	  maintain	  that	  networks	  of	  locally	  interacting	  individuals	  can	  spontaneously	  self-­‐organize	  to	  produce	  global	  coordination(21,	  22).	  	  While	  there	  is	  widespread	  interest	  in	  this	  approach	  to	  social	  norms	  (6,	  7,	  14,	  18,	  23-­‐26),	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  social	  process	  has	  prevented	  systematic	  empirical	  insight	  into	  the	  thesis	  that	  these	  local	  dynamics	  are	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  universally	  adopted	  conventions	  (27,	  28).	  	  	   Several	  difficulties	  have	  limited	  prior	  empirical	  research	  in	  this	  area.	  	  The	  most	  notable	  of	  these	  limitations	  is	  scale.	  	  While	  compelling	  experiments	  have	  successfully	  shown	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  social	  conventions	  in	  dyadic	  and	  small	  group	  interactions	  (29-­‐31)	  the	  results	  in	  small	  group	  settings	  can	  be	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  the	  dynamics	  in	  larger	  groups	  (see	  SI	  text),	  indicating	  that	  small	  group	  experiments	  are	  insufficient	  for	  demonstrating	  whether	  or	  how	  new	  conventions	  endogenously	  form	  in	  larger	  populations	  (32,	  33).	  	  Important	  progress	  on	  this	  issue	  has	  been	  made	  using	  network-­‐based	  laboratory	  experiments	  on	  larger	  groups	  (15,	  24).	  	  However	  this	  research	  has	  been	  restricted	  to	  studying	  coordination	  among	  players	  presented	  with	  two	  or	  three	  options	  with	  known	  payoffs.	  	  Natural	  convention	  formation,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  significantly	  complicated	  by	  the	  capacity	  of	  individuals	  to	  continuously	  innovate,	  which	  endogenously	  expands	  the	  ‘ecology’	  of	  alternatives	  under	  evaluation	  (23,	  29,	  31).	  	  Moreover,	  prior	  experimental	  studies	  have	  typically	  assumed	  the	  existence	  of	  either	  an	  explicit	  reward	  for	  universal	  coordination	  (15),	  or	  a	  mechanism	  that	  aggregates	  and	  reports	  the	  collective	  state	  of	  the	  population	  (17,	  24),	  which	  has	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  evaluate	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  global	  coordination	  is	  the	  result	  of	  purely	  local	  incentives.	  	  	  More	  recently,	  Data	  Science	  approaches	  to	  studying	  norms	  have	  addressed	  many	  of	  these	  issues	  by	  analyzing	  behavior	  change	  in	  large	  online	  networks	  (34).	  	  However,	  these	  observational	  studies	  are	  limited	  by	  familiar	  problems	  of	  identification	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  inability	  to	  eliminate	  the	  confounding	  influences	  of	  institutional	  mechanisms.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  previous	  empirical	  research	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  identify	  the	  collective	  dynamics	  through	  which	  social	  conventions	  can	  spontaneously	  emerge	  (8,	  34-­‐36).	  We	  addressed	  these	  issues	  by	  adopting	  a	  Web-­‐based	  experimental	  approach.	  We	  studied	  the	  effects	  of	  social	  network	  structure	  on	  the	  spontaneous	  evolution	  of	  social	  conventions	  in	  populations	  without	  any	  resources	  to	  facilitate	  global	  coordination	  (9,	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37).	  	  Participants	  in	  our	  study	  were	  rewarded	  for	  coordinating	  locally,	  however	  they	  had	  neither	  incentives,	  nor	  information	  for	  achieving	  large	  scale	  agreement.	  	  Further,	  to	  eliminate	  any	  pre-­‐existing	  bias	  in	  the	  evolutionary	  process,	  we	  studied	  the	  emergence	  of	  arbitrary	  linguistic	  conventions,	  in	  which	  none	  of	  the	  options	  had	  any	  a	  priori	  value	  or	  advantage	  over	  the	  others	  (3,	  23).	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  considered	  the	  prototypical	  problem	  of	  whether	  purely	  local	  interactions	  can	  trigger	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  universal	  naming	  convention	  (38,	  39).	  	  
Theoretical	  model	  






Experimental	  Design	  	   Each	  live	  game,	  or	  experimental	  ‘trial,’	  consisted	  of	  a	  set	  of	  participants,	  a	  specific	  social	  network	  structure,	  and	  a	  pre-­‐specified	  number	  of	  rounds	  to	  play.	  	  When	  participants	  arrived	  to	  play	  the	  game,	  they	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  positions	  within	  a	  social	  network.	  	  In	  a	  given	  round	  of	  the	  game,	  two	  network	  ‘neighbors’	  were	  chosen	  at	  random	  to	  play	  with	  one	  another.	  	  Both	  players	  simultaneously	  assigned	  names	  to	  a	  pictured	  object	  (i.e.,	  a	  human	  face),	  blindly	  attempting	  to	  coordinate	  in	  the	  real-­‐time	  exchange	  of	  naming	  choices	  (see	  SI	  text).	  	  If	  the	  players	  coordinated	  on	  a	  name,	  they	  were	  rewarded	  with	  a	  successful	  payment;	  if	  they	  failed,	  they	  were	  penalized	  (see	  Materials	  and	  Methods).	  After	  a	  single	  round,	  the	  participants	  could	  see	  only	  the	  choices	  that	  they	  and	  their	  partner	  had	  made,	  and	  their	  cumulative	  pay	  was	  updated	  accordingly.	  	  They	  were	  then	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  play	  with	  a	  new	  neighbor	  in	  their	  social	  network,	  and	  a	  new	  round	  would	  begin.	  The	  object	  that	  participants	  were	  trying	  to	  name	  was	  the	  same	  for	  the	  entire	  duration	  of	  the	  game,	  and	  for	  all	  members	  of	  the	  game.	  Participants	  in	  the	  study	  did	  not	  have	  any	  information	  about	  the	  size	  of	  the	  population	  that	  was	  attempting	  to	  coordinate,	  nor	  about	  the	  number	  of	  neighbors	  that	  they	  were	  connected	  to.	  	  	  	  
Results	  Figure	  1	  (N=24)	  shows	  that	  the	  dynamics	  of	  emergent	  social	  conventions	  depend	  decisively	  upon	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  social	  network.	  	  In	  spatial	  networks,	  populations	  enjoyed	  rapid	  local	  coordination,	  in	  some	  cases	  achieving	  a	  50%	  success	  rate	  (i.e.,	  average	  likelihood	  of	  matching	  words	  with	  a	  partner)	  as	  early	  as	  round	  4.	  	  However,	  this	  initial	  success	  rate	  quickly	  decelerated.	  	  After	  25	  rounds	  of	  play,	  average	  success	  rates	  failed	  to	  reach	  above	  75%.	  	  Throughout	  all	  of	  the	  spatial	  network	  trials,	  the	  dominant	  local	  conventions	  (i.e.,	  the	  most	  popular	  word	  choices)	  were	  never	  used	  by	  more	  than	  45%	  of	  the	  population.	  	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2,	  behavior	  in	  the	  spatial	  networks	  evolved	  through	  a	  process	  of	  local	  coarsening	  (45),	  in	  which	  emergent	  regions	  of	  coordinated	  behavior	  competed	  with	  bordering	  local	  conventions	  (45,	  49,	  50).	  	  In	  each	  of	  the	  trials,	  these	  dynamics	  inhibited	  the	  spontaneous	  emergence	  of	  global	  coordination	  by	  creating	  entrenched	  competition	  between	  endogenously	  formed	  groups	  (51).	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   Similar	  results	  were	  found	  in	  random	  networks,	  in	  which	  local	  groups	  of	  coordinated	  individuals	  emerged	  and	  competed	  for	  dominance	  (fig.1).	  	  Group	  formation	  in	  random	  networks	  was	  driven	  by	  repeated	  interactions,	  which	  created	  metastable	  boundaries	  between	  groups	  of	  neighbors	  despite	  the	  absence	  of	  local	  clustering	  (fig.2).	  	  After	  25	  rounds	  of	  play	  in	  randomized	  topologies,	  local	  groups	  still	  persisted	  and	  coordination	  rates	  never	  increased	  above	  75%.	  	  In	  all	  random	  network	  trials,	  global	  social	  conventions	  never	  emerged.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  sizes	  of	  the	  dominant	  social	  conventions	  (i.e.,	  the	  fraction	  of	  the	  population	  using	  the	  most	  popular	  word	  choice)	  were	  equivalent	  across	  all	  trials	  of	  the	  spatial	  and	  random	  networks,	  averaging	  33%	  of	  the	  population.	  	  On	  timescales	  observable	  within	  our	  study,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  social	  coordination	  in	  both	  the	  spatial	  and	  random	  network	  trials	  were	  driven	  by	  local	  group	  competition,	  which	  impeded	  the	  emergence	  of	  global	  conventions.	  	  	   Homogeneously	  mixing	  populations	  exhibited	  significantly	  different	  dynamics	  than	  those	  observed	  in	  the	  other	  two	  topologies.	  	  Initially,	  success	  rates	  were	  lower	  because	  actors	  did	  not	  have	  repeated	  interactions	  with	  their	  partners,	  which	  prevented	  “neighborhoods”	  of	  entrenched	  behavior	  from	  forming.	  	  However,	  local	  failure	  accelerated	  global	  coordination.	  	  In	  all	  trials	  with	  homogenously	  mixing	  populations,	  success	  rates	  increased	  to	  100%	  well	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study.	  	  Figure	  1	  shows	  that	  this	  rapid	  growth	  in	  individual	  success	  corresponds	  to	  the	  spontaneous	  emergence	  of	  a	  global	  social	  convention.	  	  In	  all	  trials,	  an	  emergent	  convention	  grew	  quickly,	  reaching	  over	  60%	  of	  the	  population	  by	  Round	  12,	  and	  achieving	  universal	  adoption	  between	  Rounds	  20	  and	  22.	  	  On	  average,	  by	  Round	  22	  players	  who	  had	  never	  interacted	  with	  one	  another	  were	  all	  using	  the	  same	  convention,	  and	  were	  able	  to	  consistently	  coordinate	  with	  new	  partners.	  	  	   The	  speed	  of	  self-­‐organized	  conventions	  in	  these	  networks	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  these	  coordination	  dynamics	  scale	  up	  as	  population	  sizes	  increase.	  There	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  skepticism.	  	  As	  system	  size	  increases,	  so	  does	  the	  expected	  number	  of	  competing	  alternatives	  circulating	  in	  the	  population;	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  because	  interactions	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  number	  of	  rounds	  in	  the	  game,	  increasing	  system	  size	  reduces	  the	  fraction	  of	  the	  population	  with	  which	  any	  given	  individual	  can	  interact.	  	  These	  considerations	  suggest	  that	  global	  coordination	  may	  be	  much	  more	  difficult	  in	  larger	  populations.	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Discussion	  	   To	  ensure	  that	  our	  findings	  do	  not	  rely	  in	  any	  way	  on	  participants’	  knowledge	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  population	  or	  number	  of	  interaction	  partners,	  we	  tested	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  informational	  controls	  used	  in	  our	  experimental	  design	  by	  providing	  subjects	  with	  a	  post-­‐experiment	  survey	  asking	  them	  to	  report	  i)	  the	  most	  popular	  name	  in	  their	  game,	  ii)	  the	  number	  of	  people	  in	  their	  game,	  and	  iii)	  the	  number	  of	  people	  with	  whom	  they	  interacted.	  	  Across	  all	  network	  conditions	  and	  all	  network	  sizes,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  subjects’	  responses	  regarding	  the	  size	  of	  their	  network	  or	  the	  number	  of	  neighbors	  with	  whom	  that	  they	  interacted	  (see	  SI	  text).	  	  The	  only	  difference	  in	  responses	  was	  that	  in	  all	  the	  homogeneously	  mixing	  networks	  every	  respondent	  knew	  the	  norm,	  even	  though	  none	  of	  them	  knew	  how	  many	  people	  were	  using	  it.	  	  	  	   We	  also	  evaluated	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  results	  for	  possible	  biases	  in	  the	  initial	  distribution	  of	  conventions	  based	  on	  external	  focal	  points	  (54).	  	  To	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  convergence	  may	  be	  biased	  by	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  popularity	  of	  some	  names,	  we	  conducted	  controlled	  experiments	  in	  which	  participants	  chose	  their	  options	  from	  among	  an	  arbitrary	  list	  of	  ten	  names	  whose	  order	  was	  randomized	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  experiment	  (for	  each	  participant,	  to	  avoid	  implicit	  ranking	  effects).	  Results	  from	  these	  controlled	  experiments	  are	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  results	  presented	  above	  (see	  Fig.4).	  	  Moreover,	  our	  findings	  are	  further	  supported	  by	  the	  observed	  levels	  of	  diversity	  in	  the	  emergent	  ecology	  of	  names	  in	  each	  of	  the	  other	  trials.	  	  In	  every	  trial	  of	  our	  study,	  the	  number	  of	  suggested	  names	  was	  larger	  than	  the	  size	  of	  the	  population	  (sometimes	  by	  more	  than	  a	  factor	  of	  2;	  see	  SI	  text),	  suggesting	  that	  there	  were	  no	  preferred	  options	  that	  initially	  limited	  the	  set	  of	  choices	  in	  the	  social	  evolutionary	  process.	  	  	   In	  sum,	  our	  findings	  demonstrate	  that	  social	  conventions	  can	  spontaneously	  evolve	  in	  large	  human	  populations	  without	  any	  institutional	  mechanisms	  to	  facilitate	  the	  process.	  	  Further,	  the	  results	  highlight	  the	  causal	  role	  played	  by	  network	  connectivity	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  establishing	  shared	  norms.	  	  These	  results	  contrast	  with	  prior	  work	  analyzing	  the	  effect	  of	  network	  structure	  on	  the	  speed	  of	  convergence	  (6,	  41,	  55-­‐57).	  	  However	  that	  work	  focuses	  on	  the	  situation	  where	  there	  are	  just	  two	  competing	  norms	  that	  have	  different	  payoff	  consequences.	  	  In	  our	  case,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  number	  of	  possible	  norms	  is	  not	  fixed	  in	  advance	  and	  they	  all	  have	  identical	  payoff	  consequences.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  find	  
 9 
 
that	  increased	  network	  connectivity	  can	  accelerate	  the	  rate	  of	  convergence	  to	  a	  global	  norm.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  large	  populations	  without	  global	  information	  or	  incentives	  for	  collective	  agreement	  may	  nevertheless	  rapidly	  self-­‐organize	  to	  produce	  universally	  shared	  collective	  beliefs	  and	  behaviors. 	   We	  anticipate	  that	  our	  results	  will	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  researchers	  investigating	  the	  effects	  of	  online	  connectedness	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  behaviors	  (58).	  	  In	  particular,	  a	  topic	  of	  interest	  for	  future	  work	  will	  be	  to	  explore	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  the	  unintended	  effects	  of	  increasing	  social	  connectedness	  on	  the	  homogenization	  of	  behaviors	  and	  beliefs	  among	  large	  numbers	  of	  individuals	  who	  do	  not	  even	  know	  that	  they	  are	  implicitly	  coordinating	  with	  one	  another.	  	  
Materials	  and	  Methods.	  
Experimental	  procedure.	  Participants	  in	  the	  study	  were	  recruited	  at	  large	  from	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web.	  	  When	  participants	  arrived	  to	  play	  a	  game,	  they	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  an	  experimental	  condition	  (i.e.,	  a	  social	  network),	  and	  then	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  a	  position	  within	  that	  social	  network	  (see	  SI	  text).	  In	  a	  given	  round	  of	  the	  game,	  two	  network	  “neighbors”	  were	  chosen	  at	  random	  to	  play	  with	  one	  another.	  	  Both	  players	  simultaneously	  assigned	  names	  to	  a	  pictured	  object	  (e.g.,	  a	  human	  face),	  blindly	  attempting	  to	  coordinate	  in	  the	  real-­‐time	  exchange	  of	  naming	  choices	  (see	  SI	  text).	  	  If	  the	  players	  coordinated	  on	  a	  name,	  they	  were	  rewarded	  with	  a	  successful	  payment	  ($0.50);	  if	  they	  failed,	  they	  were	  penalized	  (-­‐$0.25).	  	  (Participants	  could	  not	  go	  into	  debt,	  so	  failures	  did	  not	  incur	  a	  penalty	  if	  a	  participant	  had	  a	  balance	  of	  $0.)	  After	  a	  single	  round,	  the	  participants	  could	  see	  only	  the	  choices	  that	  they	  and	  their	  partner	  had	  made,	  and	  their	  cumulative	  pay	  was	  updated	  accordingly.	  	  They	  were	  then	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  play	  with	  a	  new	  “neighbor”	  in	  their	  social	  network,	  and	  a	  new	  round	  would	  begin.	  	  The	  object	  that	  participants	  were	  trying	  to	  name	  was	  the	  same	  for	  the	  entire	  duration	  of	  the	  game,	  and	  for	  all	  members	  of	  the	  game.	  An	  experimental	  trial	  concluded	  when	  all	  members	  completed	  the	  specified	  number	  of	  rounds.	  Participants	  did	  not	  have	  any	  information	  about	  the	  size	  the	  population,	  nor	  about	  the	  number	  of	  neighbors	  that	  they	  were	  connected	  to,	  nor	  even	  about	  which	  individuals	  they	  were	  interacting	  with	  in	  a	  given	  round.	  We	  explored	  the	  dynamics	  of	  convention	  formation	  over	  different	  network	  sizes	  (24	  ≤	  N	  ≤	  96)	  and	  degrees	  of	  social	  connectedness	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(4	  ≤	  Z	  ≤	  N-­‐1).	  	  However,	  the	  controls	  within	  the	  experiment	  design	  ensured	  that	  the	  informational	  resources	  provided	  to	  subjects	  were	  identical	  across	  all	  conditions	  of	  the	  study.	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Figure	  2.	  	  Temporal	  dynamics	  of	  convention	  formation	  in	  representative	  























































	  	  	  	  
	  










































































Supplementary	  Information	  	  	  (Please	  note	  a	  new	  reference	  numbering	  for	  the	  SI)	  	  
Experimental	  Design.	  	  	   Each	  trial	  of	  the	  study	  consisted	  of	  a	  network	  structure,	  a	  pre-­‐specified	  number	  of	  rounds,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  participants	  equal	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  network	  (N).	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  a	  trial	  (i.e.,	  an	  active	  network),	  and	  then	  they	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  a	  node	  within	  that	  network	  (see	  Figure	  S1).	  Participants	  had	  no	  information	  about	  who,	  or	  how	  many	  individuals	  they	  were	  directly	  connected	  to,	  or	  how	  many	  people	  were	  in	  the	  population.	  The	  subject	  experience	  was	  identical	  in	  every	  network	  condition.	  Consequently,	  any	  differences	  in	  collective	  behaviour	  across	  network	  conditions	  were	  due	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  interaction	  networks,	  and	  not	  to	  information	  the	  subjects	  had	  about	  the	  structure	  or	  size	  of	  the	  population	  that	  they	  were	  in.	  	  
Subject	  Experience.	  	  	   Each	  round,	  subjects	  were	  randomly	  paired	  with	  one	  of	  their	  network	  neighbors,	  and	  shown	  a	  picture	  for	  which	  they	  had	  to	  enter	  a	  name	  (Figure	  S2.a).	  They	  were	  given	  a	  20	  second	  time	  limit	  in	  which	  they	  could	  enter	  a	  name	  for	  the	  pictured	  face.	  During	  the	  same	  time	  interval,	  their	  partner	  was	  given	  the	  same	  face,	  and	  the	  same	  time	  limit.	  If	  either	  subject	  did	  not	  complete	  an	  answer	  in	  the	  allotted	  time,	  the	  system	  registered	  a	  void	  answer,	  and	  that	  round	  was	  considered	  a	  “null”	  round	  in	  which	  no	  information	  was	  exchanged.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  participants’	  scores,	  both	  participants	  were	  registered	  as	  a	  failed	  interaction	  for	  a	  given	  round	  if	  one	  or	  both	  of	  them	  produced	  a	  void	  answer.	  Alternatively,	  if	  both	  players	  entered	  a	  name	  for	  the	  pictured	  face	  within	  the	  time	  limit,	  the	  round	  concluded	  with	  a	  page	  that	  told	  both	  subjects	  the	  name	  their	  partner	  entered,	  and	  indicated	  whether	  they	  successfully	  matched	  or	  not.	  Their	  score	  for	  that	  round	  was	  indicated	  as	  either	  a	  “match”	  or	  a	  “no	  match,”	  respectively,	  depending	  on	  whether	  they	  were	  successful	  or	  not.	  Accordingly,	  the	  players’	  scores	  were	  also	  updated	  based	  on	  whether	  they	  succeeded	  or	  not	  (Figure	  S2.b).	  The	  players	  then	  waited	  to	  be	  assigned	  with	  a	  new	  partner	  (another	  one	  of	  their	  network	  neighbors).	  Once	  a	  player	  was	  assigned,	  the	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player	  was	  again	  presented	  with	  same	  game	  screen	  and	  the	  opportunity	  to	  name	  the	  image,	  within	  the	  20	  second	  time	  interval	  (Figure	  S2.c).	  This	  procedure	  was	  repeated	  for	  the	  allotted	  number	  of	  rounds	  until	  the	  player	  had	  completed	  the	  pre-­‐specified	  number	  of	  rounds.	  	  	   Each	  player	  was	  permitted	  to	  move	  at	  their	  own	  pace	  through	  the	  game.	  Some	  players	  may	  therefore	  have	  completed	  their	  allotted	  number	  of	  rounds	  before	  some	  of	  their	  network	  neighbors.	  To	  ensure	  that	  none	  of	  these	  neighbors	  was	  “stranded”	  with	  all	  of	  their	  neighbors	  finishing	  before	  they	  could	  complete	  the	  pre-­‐specified	  number	  of	  rounds,	  some	  players	  were	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  play	  additional	  rounds	  of	  the	  game	  until	  the	  slower	  player	  had	  completed	  her	  full	  allotment	  of	  rounds.	  These	  additional	  rounds	  were	  identical	  to	  the	  earlier	  rounds,	  and	  ensured	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  game,	  every	  subject	  had	  played	  at	  least	  the	  pre-­‐	  specified	  number	  of	  rounds.	  When	  all	  subjects	  had	  completed	  the	  pre-­‐specified	  number	  of	  rounds,	  the	  game	  ended.	  	  
Subject	  Recruitment.	  	  	   Participants	  in	  our	  study	  were	  recruited	  at	  large	  from	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web	  to	  be	  players	  in	  the	  “Name	  Game”.	  When	  they	  arrived	  to	  the	  study,	  each	  participant	  completed	  the	  registration	  by	  choosing	  a	  username	  and	  an	  avatar.	  Participants	  were	  then	  provided	  with	  a	  specific	  time	  to	  return	  to	  the	  site	  when	  they	  would	  play	  the	  live	  Name	  Game	  with	  a	  group	  of	  anonymous,	  randomly	  selected	  subjects.	  The	  study	  was	  run	  for	  a	  140-­‐day	  period,	  over	  which	  time	  recruitment	  campaigns	  were	  conducted	  to	  attract	  subjects	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  study.	  	  In	  total,	  510	  subjects	  were	  recruited	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  study.	  120	  of	  them	  participated	  in	  spatially	  embedded	  lattice	  networks,	  96	  of	  them	  participated	  in	  randomly	  connected	  graphs,	  and	  264	  of	  them	  participated	  in	  homogeneously	  mixing	  networks,	  as	  detailed	  below	  in	  the	  Data	  Analysis	  and	  Replication	  sections.	  Subjects	  were	  recruited	  through	  email	  advertisements	  sent	  to	  a	  broad	  list	  of	  websites	  that	  subscribe	  to	  the	  Adweek	  mailing	  list.	  	  	  
Network	  Structures.	  Each	  trial	  of	  the	  study	  consisted	  of	  a	  network	  structure	  and	  a	  population	  that	  filled	  it.	  We	  explored	  three	  different	  topologies	  within	  our	  design.	  1)	  A	  spatially	  embedded	  network,	  which	  was	  structured	  as	  a	  one-­‐dimensional	  lattice	  with	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degree	  4.	  Each	  node	  was	  tied	  to	  nearest	  neighbors	  and	  next-­‐nearest	  neighbors.	  2)	  A	  random	  network	  topology,	  which	  was	  structured	  as	  a	  random	  graph	  with	  constant	  degree	  4.	  3)	  A	  homogeneously	  mixing	  population,	  or	  a	  complete	  graph.	  Each	  of	  these	  topologies	  was	  tested	  for	  populations	  of	  size	  N=24	  and	  N=48.	  For	  N=96,	  we	  conducted	  a	  single	  study	  with	  the	  homogeneously	  mixing	  network	  (See	  Replication	  section).	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  Model	  section	  below,	  our	  formal	  predictions	  for	  N=96	  were	  qualitatively	  the	  same	  those	  found	  for	  N=48	  and	  N=24.	  	  
	  
Data	  Analysis.	  	  	   The	  experimental	  data	  were	  produced	  as	  a	  chronological	  sequence	  of	  rounds,	  ordered	  according	  to	  the	  starting	  time	  of	  the	  game	  (Figure	  S3).	  Each	  round	  consisted	  of	  two	  participants	  each	  typing	  a	  name.	  As	  described	  above,	  users	  had	  20	  seconds	  to	  type	  a	  name,	  after	  which	  time	  the	  system	  registered	  their	  answer	  as	  void.	  A	  round	  was	  considered	  successful	  only	  when	  the	  two	  participants	  entered	  the	  same	  name,	  irrespective	  of	  case.	  In	  the	  analysis,	  the	  population’s	  evolutionary	  time	  scale	  is	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  number	  of	  times	  the	  entire	  population	  goes	  through	  a	  single	  round	  of	  the	  game,	  which	  we	  refer	  to	  as	  a	  single	  “Round	  Played.”	  A	  Round	  Played	  for	  the	  population	  corresponds	  to	  N/2	  individual	  rounds	  in	  the	  data	  sequence.	  Thus,	  a	  Round	  Played	  is	  equivalent	  to	  N/2	  pairs	  (i.e.,	  the	  entire	  population)	  all	  playing	  once.	  This	  approach	  allows	  us	  to	  measure	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  entire	  population	  through	  sequential	  rounds	  of	  the	  Name	  Game,	  based	  on	  the	  standard	  mapping	  between	  Monte	  Carlo	  steps	  and	  microscopic	  interactions	  (1).	  The	  value	  of	  each	  measured	  quantity	  for	  the	  population	  at	  any	  Round	  Played	  is	  obtained	  by	  averaging	  over	  the	  last	  N/2	  individual	  rounds.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  average	  success	  rate	  of	  the	  population	  at	  the	  (x+1)th	  Round	  Played	  corresponds	  to	  the	  average	  of	  the	  individual	  outcomes	  in	  the	  interval	  between	  the	  lines	  (xN/2+1)	  and	  (x+1)N/2	  in	  the	  data	  sequence	  (success	  being	  a	  binary	  variable,	  is	  assigned	  values	  0	  or	  1	  at	  each	  individual	  round)	  (Figure	  S3).	  Analogously,	  the	  frequency	  of	  each	  norm	  at	  the	  (x+1)th	  Round	  Played	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  frequency	  of	  the	  other	  norms	  in	  the	  same	  interval.	  If	  either	  member	  of	  a	  given	  pair	  fails	  to	  type	  a	  name	  within	  an	  interaction,	  then	  this	  interaction	  is	  treated	  as	  void.	  	  
	   Treatment	  of	  void	  answer	  field.	  If	  either	  member	  of	  a	  given	  pair	  produces	  an	  empty	  field	  within	  an	  interaction,	  then	  this	  interaction	  is	  treated	  as	  void.	  This	  is	  handled	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differently	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  success	  versus	  the	  analysis	  of	  norm	  ecology.	  For	  success	  rates,	  a	  void	  entry	  from	  either	  member	  of	  a	  pair	  indicates	  non-­‐participation	  (i.e.,	  a	  null	  interaction)	  in	  that	  round.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  temporal	  evolution	  of	  the	  success	  rate	  we	  disregarded	  all	  those	  interactions	  in	  which	  void	  entries	  appears.	  For	  analyzing	  the	  evolving	  norm	  ecology,	  however,	  if	  only	  one	  member	  of	  a	  pair	  produced	  a	  void	  field	  while	  the	  other	  member	  typed	  a	  name,	  we	  include	  the	  name	  that	  was	  typed	  by	  the	  active	  participant	  as	  a	  data	  point	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  active	  names	  within	  the	  population.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  for	  a	  single	  experimental	  realization,	  the	  considered	  temporal	  sequence	  can	  be	  slightly	  different	  for	  the	  series	  of	  pairwise	  success	  and	  that	  of	  the	  overall	  norm	  ecology.	  It	  is	  worth	  stressing	  that	  all	  results	  are	  robust	  against	  variations	  of	  the	  specific	  procedure	  adopted	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  void	  field,	  and	  that	  different	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  interactions	  in	  which	  one	  of	  the	  participants	  did	  not	  type	  any	  guess	  produce	  results	  that	  are	  equivalent,	  and	  virtually	  undistinguishable,	  under	  any	  respect.	  	  
Replication.	  
	   	  The	  results	  presented	  in	  the	  main	  text	  were	  consistent	  across	  all	  replications	  of	  our	  experiments.	  	  We	  replicated	  the	  experiment	  8	  times	  for	  homogeneous	  mixing	  populations	  (N=12,	  24,	  48,	  96),	  6	  times	  for	  the	  spatial	  networks	  (N=12,	  24,	  48)	  and	  3	  times	  for	  the	  random	  networks	  (N=24,	  48).	  All	  trials	  of	  size	  N=24	  were	  run	  for	  an	  average	  of	  25	  rounds;	  trials	  of	  N=48	  were	  run	  for	  an	  average	  of	  30	  rounds,	  and	  the	  trial	  of	  N=96	  was	  run	  for	  40	  rounds.	  	  	   The	  choice	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  trials	  was	  dictated	  by	  our	  research	  questions.	  	  As	  predicted	  by	  the	  model,	  small	  N	  trials	  (N=12)	  produced	  similar	  dynamics	  across	  all	  experimental	  conditions,	  preventing	  any	  identification	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  network	  structure	  on	  convention	  formation.	  	  Six	  trials	  were	  conducted	  with	  N=24.	  	  According	  to	  our	  model,	  this	  was	  the	  minimal	  population	  size	  at	  which	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  emergent	  dynamics	  of	  local	  coarsening	  versus	  symmetry	  breaking	  could	  be	  detected.	  	  For	  robustness,	  each	  trial	  was	  replicated	  twice	  in	  each	  condition.	  	  This	  allowed	  identification	  of	  the	  main	  dynamical	  differences	  across	  conditions	  and	  assessment	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  model	  predictions,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1	  of	  the	  main	  text.	  The	  replications	  with	  N=48	  corroborated	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these	  results	  in	  larger	  networks	  and	  allowed	  us	  to	  obtain	  data	  sufficient	  to	  construct	  the	  distributional	  analyses	  presented	  in	  Figure	  3	  of	  the	  main	  text.	  	  	  	   Because	  consensus	  becomes	  more	  difficult	  with	  increasing	  scale,	  the	  failures	  in	  the	  spatial	  lattices	  and	  random	  networks	  indicated	  that	  larger	  N	  studies	  with	  those	  topologies	  would	  yield	  similar	  results.	  	  Our	  focus	  for	  additional	  replications	  was	  thus	  the	  homogeneously	  mixing	  population,	  i.e.,	  the	  only	  condition	  in	  which	  a	  global	  consensus	  emerges	  in	  our	  experiments.	  	  We	  replicated	  the	  N=48	  homogenously	  mixing	  experiment	  a	  second	  time,	  and	  additionally	  we	  tested	  our	  results	  in	  a	  final,	  considerably	  more	  demanding	  trial	  with	  96	  participants.	  	  As	  a	  final	  test	  of	  our	  findings,	  we	  also	  conducted	  two	  "Name	  List"	  trials,	  which	  served	  as	  a	  further	  check	  on	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  results	  (see	  “Robustness”	  section	  below).	  	  
Robustness.	  	  	   A	  possible	  concern	  with	  the	  design	  of	  our	  study	  is	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  words	  entered	  by	  subjects	  would	  be	  skewed	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  particularly	  salient	  name	  (where	  saliency	  could	  have	  been	  due	  to	  a	  vast	  range	  of	  external	  events/factors,	  such	  as	  the	  celebrities	  in	  the	  news,	  etc.),	  which	  would	  drive	  convergence	  by	  artificially	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  options	  in	  the	  population.	  To	  check	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  results	  in	  a	  setting	  that	  eliminated	  these	  concerns,	  we	  replicated	  our	  study	  in	  homogeneous	  mixing	  and	  spatial	  networks	  of	  size	  N=24,	  in	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  participants	  could	  not	  type	  their	  own	  name	  entries.	  Instead	  of	  allowing	  participants	  to	  enter	  their	  proposed	  name	  in	  a	  text	  box,	  we	  provided	  them	  a	  fixed	  list	  of	  10	  names.	  Participants	  had	  to	  name	  a	  feminine	  face,	  and	  could	  select	  in	  each	  round	  one	  name	  from	  the	  fixed	  list	  of:	  Sophia,	  Emma,	  Isabella,	  Olivia,	  Ava,	  Emily,	  Abigail,	  Mia,	  Madison,	  and	  Elizabeth;	  corresponding	  to	  the	  most	  popular	  baby	  names	  for	  females	  for	  2012	  in	  the	  U.S.	  according	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Social	  Security	  Office	  (2).	  The	  order	  of	  these	  names	  was	  randomized	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  experiment	  for	  each	  participant,	  in	  order	  to	  rule	  out	  possible	  ordering	  biases.	  Figure	  S4	  (bottom	  row)	  shows	  that	  the	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  those	  obtained	  in	  the	  trials	  using	  open	  field	  name	  entry.	  	   As	  a	  secondary	  check	  on	  our	  results,	  we	  examined	  the	  data	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  list	  of	  actual	  names	  that	  were	  suggested	  by	  subjects	  in	  any	  of	  the	  trials	  was	  artificially	  limited	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  options.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  S4,	  in	  each	  of	  the	  conditions	  with	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open	  name	  fields,	  the	  number	  of	  names	  entered	  by	  subjects	  was	  greater	  than	  the	  size	  of	  the	  population	  in	  the	  game.	  	  	  
Post-­‐trial	  user	  tests.	  	  	   To	  ensure	  that	  the	  informational	  controls	  in	  our	  study	  were	  effective,	  we	  provided	  subjects	  from	  five	  selected	  trials	  with	  a	  post-­‐study	  questionnaire,	  asking	  them	  to	  report	  1)	  the	  number	  of	  people	  in	  their	  game,	  and	  2)	  the	  number	  of	  people	  with	  whom	  they	  directly	  interacted.	  Figure	  S5(a)	  shows	  the	  mean	  and	  standard	  deviation	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  number	  of	  people	  in	  the	  game	  (normalized	  by	  the	  number	  of	  rounds	  that	  subjects	  played).	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  average	  responses	  across	  network	  structures	  and	  network	  sizes	  (p	  >	  0.2,	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  U-­‐Test).	  Similarly,	  Figure	  S5(b)	  shows	  the	  normalized	  mean	  and	  standard	  deviation	  of	  responses	  for	  the	  number	  of	  people	  that	  players	  believed	  they	  interacted	  with.	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  average	  responses	  across	  network	  structures	  and	  network	  sizes	  (p	  >	  0.2,	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  U-­‐Test).	  	  
Limitations	  of	  the	  Study.	  	  	   As	  with	  all	  experiments,	  the	  scientific	  controls	  that	  made	  this	  study	  possible	  also	  present	  limitations.	  Most	  notably,	  practical	  constraints	  on	  the	  number	  of	  people	  that	  can	  be	  recruited	  to	  simultaneously	  participate	  in	  an	  evolving	  social	  convention	  within	  an	  experimental	  environment	  prevented	  us	  from	  running	  larger	  experiments	  (i.e.,	  N	  >	  100).	  These	  constraints	  also	  limited	  the	  duration	  of	  our	  experiments	  –	  i.e.,	  the	  number	  of	  rounds	  of	  play	  –	  since	  our	  design	  relied	  on	  subjects’	  sustained	  behavioral	  engagement	  over	  the	  entire	  study.	  While	  these	  practical	  constraints	  limited	  the	  size	  of	  our	  empirical	  study,	  the	  correspondence	  between	  our	  model	  and	  the	  experimental	  data	  provides	  guidance	  for	  our	  expectations	  about	  how	  these	  evolutionary	  systems	  behave	  at	  larger	  sizes	  and	  longer	  time	  scales.	  As	  discussed	  below	  in	  the	  Model	  section,	  the	  results	  from	  our	  simulations	  suggest	  convergence	  time	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  networks	  scales	  as	  a	  direct	  function	  of	  the	  topology.	  For	  spatial	  lattices,	  convergence	  is	  expected	  to	  scale	  as	  O(N2)	  Rounds	  Played,	  while	  for	  both	  the	  random	  graph	  and	  the	  homogeneously	  mixing	  population,	  convergence	  time	  is	  expected	  to	  scale	  as	  O(N0.5)	  Rounds	  Played.	  Based	  on	  the	  agreement	  between	  our	  experimental	  results	  and	  the	  model,	  we	  speculate	  that	  the	  dynamics	  of	  norm	  evolution	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within	  each	  network	  topology	  will	  follow	  the	  patterns	  of	  coarsening	  (in	  the	  spatial	  lattice	  and	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  random	  graph)	  and	  symmetry	  breaking	  (in	  the	  homogeneously	  mixing	  population	  and	  late	  stages	  of	  the	  random	  graph),	  as	  described	  below.	  	  	  	  
Model.	  	  	   The	  Naming	  Game	  model	  constructs	  a	  population	  of	  N	  agents	  that	  engage	  in	  pairwise	  interactions	  in	  order	  to	  negotiate	  local	  coordination,	  and	  is	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  global	  convention	  among	  them	  (3).	  An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  game	  is	  that	  of	  a	  population	  that	  has	  to	  reach	  consensus	  on	  the	  name	  for	  an	  object,	  using	  only	  local	  interactions,	  as	  in	  the	  Name	  Game	  experiment.	  	   In	  the	  model,	  each	  agent	  has	  an	  internal	  name	  inventory	  in	  which	  an	  a	  priori	  unlimited	  number	  of	  words	  can	  be	  stored.	  As	  an	  initial	  condition,	  all	  inventories	  are	  empty.	  At	  each	  time	  step,	  a	  pair	  of	  agents	  is	  chosen	  randomly,	  one	  playing	  as	  “speaker”,	  the	  other	  as	  “hearer”,	  and	  interact	  according	  to	  the	  following	  rules:	  
• The	  speaker	  randomly	  selects	  one	  of	  her	  words	  (or	  invents	  a	  new	  word	  if	  her	  inventory	  is	  empty)	  and	  conveys	  it	  to	  the	  hearer;	  	  
• If	  the	  hearer’s	  inventory	  contains	  such	  a	  word,	  the	  two	  agents	  update	  their	  inventories	  so	  as	  to	  keep	  only	  the	  word	  involved	  in	  the	  interaction	  (success);	  	  






Homogeneous	  mixing	  populations	  	   In	  homogeneously	  mixing	  populations,	  step	  (iii)	  above	  is	  triggered	  by	  a	  symmetry	  breaking	  in	  the	  ecology	  of	  conventions,	  in	  which	  the	  most	  popular	  norm	  will	  progressively	  eliminate	  all	  the	  competitors.	  For	  a	  population	  of	  size	  N,	  consensus	  is	  reached	  in	  a	  time	  
tconv~0(N1.5)	  microscopic	  interactions,	  i.e.	  in	  O(N0.5)	  Rounds	  Played,	  according	  to	  our	  definition	  (3).	  	  	  	   The	  symmetry	  breaking	  process	  has	  been	  clarified	  analytically	  by	  considering	  a	  system	  prepared	  in	  an	  initial	  configuration	  in	  which	  half	  of	  the	  population	  knows	  only	  convention	  “A”	  and	  the	  other	  half	  only	  convention	  “B”	  (3,	  4).	  Here,	  stochastic	  fluctuations	  break	  the	  initial	  symmetry	  between	  the	  two	  norms	  making	  one	  of	  them	  more	  popular,	  and	  the	  interaction	  dynamics	  amplify	  this	  small	  advantage	  until	  a	  final	  state	  in	  which	  the	  initially	  disadvantaged	  convention	  is	  extinct.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  limit	  of	  large	  population,	  any	  initial	  imbalance	  in	  favour	  of	  one	  of	  the	  two	  conventions	  will	  eventually	  determine	  the	  success	  of	  that	  convention	  (4,	  5).	  	  	   The	  situation	  is	  more	  complex	  when	  more	  than	  two	  conventions	  are	  present	  in	  the	  system,	  but	  the	  overall	  symmetry-­‐breaking	  picture	  remains	  the	  same	  (3,	  5).	  This	  mechanism	  is	  radically	  different	  from	  what	  is	  observed	  in	  pure	  imitation	  models,	  such	  as	  the	  Moran	  process	  or	  the	  voter	  model,	  where	  fluctuations	  dominate	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  process	  leading	  to	  consensus,	  and	  the	  advantage	  of	  one	  of	  the	  competing	  states	  can	  be	  reversed	  easily	  during	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  process	  (6).	  When	  only	  pure	  imitation	  is	  at	  work,	  the	  fluctuation-­‐	  driven	  consensus	  is	  reached	  in	  O(N)	  Rounds	  Played	  (or	  Monte-­‐Carlo	  steps).	  	  
Networked	  populations	  In	  the	  model	  described	  above,	  at	  each	  time	  step	  two	  agents	  are	  randomly	  selected.	  The	  assumption	  behind	  this	  homogeneous	  mixing,	  or	  “mean-­‐field”,	  rule	  is	  that	  the	  population	  is	  not	  structured	  and	  that	  any	  agent	  can	  in	  principle	  interact	  with	  any	  other.	  However,	  when	  actors	  are	  embedded	  in	  a	  fixed	  network,	  the	  topology	  in	  which	  the	  population	  is	  embedded	  identifies	  the	  set	  of	  possible	  interactions	  among	  the	  individuals.	  Thus,	  the	  group	  of	  communicating	  individuals	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  network	  in	  which	  each	  node	  represents	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an	  agent	  and	  the	  links	  connecting	  different	  nodes	  determine	  the	  allowed	  communication	  channels.	  The	  (statistical)	  properties	  of	  the	  underlying	  network	  significantly	  affect	  the	  overall	  dynamics	  of	  the	  model.	  	  
Lattices.	  On	  low-­‐dimensional	  lattices	  each	  agent	  can	  rapidly	  interact	  two	  or	  more	  times	  with	  its	  neighbors,	  favoring	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  local	  consensus	  with	  a	  high	  success	  rate,	  i.e.	  of	  small	  sets	  of	  neighboring	  agents	  sharing	  a	  common	  unique	  word.	  As	  the	  process	  evolves,	  these	  “clusters”	  of	  neighboring	  agents	  with	  a	  common	  unique	  word	  undergo	  a	  coarsening	  phenomenon	  with	  a	  competition	  among	  them	  driven	  by	  the	  fluctuations	  of	  the	  interfaces.	  The	  coarsening	  picture	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  higher	  dimensions,	  and	  the	  scaling	  of	  the	  convergence	  time	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  O(N2/d),	  where	  d	  ≤	  4	  is	  the	  dimensionality	  of	  the	  space	  (7).	  This	  prediction	  has	  been	  confirmed	  numerically.	  	  
Small-­‐world	  networks.	  Results	  concerning	  the	  homogeneously	  mixed	  population,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  regular	  lattices,	  on	  the	  other,	  act	  as	  fundamental	  references	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  the	  different	  properties	  of	  complex	  networks.	  In	  between	  these	  regimes,	  the	  small-­‐world	  network	  (8)	  allows	  us	  to	  interpolate	  progressively	  from	  regular	  structures	  to	  random	  graphs	  by	  tuning	  the	  p	  parameter	  describing	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  link	  of	  the	  regular	  structure	  is	  rewired	  to	  a	  random	  destination.	  The	  main	  result	  is	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  shortcuts,	  linking	  agents	  otherwise	  far	  from	  each	  other,	  allows	  recovering	  the	  fast	  convergence	  typical	  of	  the	  mean-­‐field	  case.	  The	  finite	  connectivity,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  guarantees	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  good	  degree	  of	  coordination	  between	  neighbors	  from	  the	  start	  of	  the	  dynamics,	  as	  in	  regular	  structures.	  	   In	  these	  randomized	  topologies,	  two	  different	  regimes	  are	  observed	  (9).	  For	  times	  shorter	  than	  a	  cross-­‐over	  time,	  tcross	  =	  O(N/p2),	  one	  observes	  the	  usual	  coarsening	  phenomena	  since	  the	  clusters	  are	  typically	  one-­‐dimensional,	  i.e.,	  since	  the	  typical	  cluster	  size	  is	  smaller	  than	  1/p.	  For	  times	  much	  larger	  than	  tcross,	  the	  dynamics	  shift.	  They	  become	  dominated	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  shortcuts,	  and	  follow	  the	  mean-­‐field	  behavior	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  observed	  on	  the	  complete	  graph.	  The	  convergence	  time,	  measured	  in	  microscopic	  interactions,	  scales	  therefore	  as	  N1/2	  and	  not	  as	  N2/d	  (as	  in	  low-­‐dimensional	  lattices)	  (9).	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Complex	  networks.	  Most	  of	  the	  relevant	  features	  exhibited	  by	  complex	  networks	  have	  been	  explored	  systematically,	  mainly	  by	  means	  of	  computer	  simulations.	  The	  scaling	  exponents	  observed	  in	  both	  homogeneous	  (eg	  Erdös-­‐Rényi	  (10))	  and	  heterogeneous	  (eg	  Barabási-­‐Albert	  (11))	  networks	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  observed	  in	  the	  Watts-­‐Strogatz	  small-­‐world	  graphs	  (8)	  for	  both	  consensus	  time	  and	  memory	  usage.	  In	  particular,	  the	  scaling	  laws	  observed	  for	  the	  convergence	  time	  is	  a	  general	  robust	  feature	  that	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  further	  topological	  details,	  such	  as	  the	  average	  degree,	  the	  clustering	  or	  the	  particular	  form	  of	  the	  degree	  distribution	  (12).	  	  
3.	  Robustness	  of	  the	  model	  The	  model	  described	  above	  has	  been	  modified	  in	  several	  directions	  to	  test	  its	  robustness	  (6,	  13-­‐21).	  For	  example,	  the	  rule	  describing	  how	  a	  word	  is	  selected	  from	  the	  inventory	  has	  been	  investigated,	  and	  more	  efficient	  strategies	  have	  been	  identified	  (13).	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  the	  symmetric	  update	  of	  the	  inventories	  has	  been	  altered	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  feedback	  between	  the	  agents	  has	  been	  investigated	  (16,	  21).	  However,	  all	  permutations	  of	  the	  model	  exhibit	  qualitatively	  similar	  dynamics,	  which	  rely	  on	  two	  essential	  elements:	  1)	  memory	  and	  2)	  the	  fact	  that	  for	  a	  success	  to	  take	  place	  both	  agents	  must	  have	  already	  heard	  the	  successful	  convention	  in	  the	  past.	  That	  is,	  actors	  depend	  upon	  multiple	  exposures	  to	  a	  term	  in	  order	  to	  successfully	  coordinate	  on	  it	  (22).	  These	  two	  elements	  seem	  to	  be	  crucial	  to	  reproduce	  the	  observed	  dynamics	  of	  coarsening	  on	  low	  dimensional	  lattices	  and	  symmetry	  breaking	  in	  random	  networks	  and	  homogeneously	  mixing	  populations.	  	  
Model	  rules	  and	  user	  behavior.	  To	  test	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  model	  and	  the	  experimental	  results	  in	  more	  depth,	  we	  investigated	  how	  well	  the	  individual	  behavior	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  study	  matched	  with	  the	  theoretical	  model.	  	  We	  then	  simulated	  the	  long	  term	  dynamics	  of	  the	  real	  user	  behaviors,	  and	  compared	  it	  to	  the	  expected	  dynamics	  from	  the	  theoretical	  model.	  	  	  In	  the	  theoretical	  model,	  agents	  accrue	  a	  list	  of	  word	  options	  based	  on	  their	  history	  of	  interactions.	  	  The	  only	  words	  that	  they	  can	  enter	  at	  a	  given	  round	  are	  those	  that	  currently	  exist	  in	  their	  inventory.	  	  If	  they	  experience	  a	  successful	  match,	  their	  inventory	  is	  deleted	  except	  for	  the	  matching	  word.	  	  The	  inventory	  can	  increase	  again	  through	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subsequent	  interactions,	  however	  any	  subsequent	  matches	  again	  reset	  the	  inventory	  to	  1,	  leaving	  only	  the	  most	  recent	  matching	  word.	  	  We	  evaluated	  subjects’	  behavior	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  the	  answers	  they	  provided	  at	  every	  round	  were	  consistent	  with	  answers	  that	  agents	  in	  our	  theoretical	  model	  could	  have	  provided;	  i.e.,	  we	  evaluated	  whether	  the	  answers	  that	  subjects	  actually	  used	  would	  have	  been	  in	  their	  “inventories”	  if	  they	  had	  followed	  the	  same	  rules	  as	  the	  model,	  given	  their	  histories	  of	  past	  interactions,	  failures	  and	  successes.	  	  	   	   	  Remarkably,	  we	  found	  a	  95%	  agreement	  between	  the	  model	  and	  the	  subjects’	  behaviors.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  95%	  of	  the	  time,	  subjects’	  choices	  were	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  theoretical	  model.	  	  When	  these	  individual	  dynamics	  were	  simulated	  (95%	  model	  rules,	  5%	  random	  entries	  –	  either	  through	  novel	  word	  choice,	  or	  through	  choosing	  words	  from	  a	  deleted	  inventory),	  the	  collective	  dynamics	  were	  indistinguishable	  from	  those	  of	  the	  theoretical	  model.	  	  Consistent	  with	  the	  model,	  these	  results	  suggest	  that	  subjects’	  behaviors	  were	  governed	  more	  by	  their	  recent	  successes	  than	  by	  their	  history	  of	  past	  plays.	  
	  
Model	  implications.	  	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  main	  text,	  the	  model	  captures	  well	  the	  results	  of	  the	  Name	  Game	  experiment,	  and	  the	  microscopic	  rules	  provide	  a	  good	  fit	  with	  the	  empirically	  measured	  user	  behavior.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  experimental	  constraints	  limit	  the	  region	  of	  accessible	  parameters,	  in	  particular	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  duration	  of	  an	  experiment	  and	  the	  population	  size.	  The	  model	  behavior	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  grounded	  predictions	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  experiments	  at	  larger	  scales.	  In	  particular	  we	  would	  expect	  that:	  	   a)	  The	  dynamics	  observed	  on	  the	  random	  graph	  would	  eventually	  be	  different	  from	  the	  one	  of	  spatial	  networks,	  and	  the	  scaling	  of	  the	  convergence	  time	  with	  the	  population	  size	  will	  be	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  observed	  in	  the	  homogeneously	  mixing	  population	  (9).	  	   b)	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  the	  spatial	  graph	  and	  the	  homogeneously	  mixing	  population	  will	  be	  more	  and	  more	  significant	  (12).	  	   c)	  The	  symmetry	  breaking	  transition,	  which	  governs	  the	  consensus	  process	  in	  the	  homogeneously	  mixing	  population	  will	  result	  in	  a	  characteristic	  S-­‐shaped	  behavior	  of	  the	  success	  rate	  curve	  (3).	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   Figure	  S6	  shows	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  space	  of	  norms	  for	  the	  three	  networks	  considered	  in	  the	  main	  text,	  (a,d)	  spatial	  lattice	  networks,	  (b,e)	  random	  graphs,	  and	  (c,f)	  homogeneously	  mixing,	  for	  populations	  of	  N=48.	  Panels	  a-­‐c	  show	  the	  results	  for	  the	  experimentally	  accessible	  regions	  of	  the	  dynamics	  (i.e.,	  30	  Rounds).	  Panels	  d-­‐f	  show	  the	  same	  simulations	  with	  time	  scales	  extended	  until	  final	  convergence.	  To	  demonstrate	  these	  effects	  at	  larger	  population	  scales,	  Figure	  S7	  shows	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  player	  success	  rate	  until	  model	  convergence	  in	  all	  three	  network	  conditions	  for	  populations	  of	  size	  of	  N=1000.	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Figure	  S5.	  	  Subject’s	  informational	  awareness	  about	  experimental	  conditions.	  (a)	  Subjects’	  reported	  beliefs	  about	  the	  number	  of	  people	  they	  interacted	  with	  are	  shown	  for	  five	  experimental	  trials	  (normalized	  by	  the	  number	  of	  rounds	  that	  subjects	  played).	  	  Results	  are	  shown	  for	  a	  representative	  (1)	  Spatial	  Network	  N=24,	  (2)	  Homogeneous	  Mixing	  



















































Figure	  S6.	  Numerical	  simulations	  of	  evolution	  to	  final	  consensus.	  	  (a,d)	  Spatial	  network,	  (b,e)	  Random	  network,	  (c,f)	  homogeneously	  mixing	  population.	  The	  top	  panels	  
(a-­‐c)	  show	  the	  temporal	  evolution	  in	  the	  first	  30	  rounds,	  i.e.	  in	  the	  experimentally	  accessible	  regions	  of	  the	  dynamics.	  The	  bottom	  panels	  (d-­‐f)	  show	  the	  same	  simulations	  run	  until	  final	  convergence.	  	  For	  the	  spatial	  network	  final	  consensus	  requires	  more	  than	  1000	  rounds	  of	  play.	  After	  approximately	  300	  rounds	  only	  two	  conventions	  remain	  in	  the	  population,	  and	  they	  swap	  their	  rank	  twice	  as	  the	  dynamics	  proceeds	  through	  local	  coarsening.	  	  In	  the	  random	  graph,	  the	  initial	  clusters	  of	  local	  coordination	  are	  more	  permeable	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  spatial	  structure	  and	  therefore	  permit	  symmetry	  breaking	  on	  longer	  timescales.	  In	  Figure,	  local	  coarsening	  shifts	  to	  symmetry	  breaking	  within	  ~120	  rounds,	  and	  the	  population	  reaches	  convergence	  by	  180	  rounds.	  	  In	  the	  homogeneously	  mixing	  population,	  rapid	  symmetry	  breaking	  leads	  to	  convergence	  on	  accelerated	  timescales	  detectable	  within	  the	  experimental	  window.	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